Respond to the questions bulleted below.44 The Virtues of the SoulSee 441c-444a . Having established that the soul has an internal structure similar to that of the city, they use the definition of each of the city’s virtues as a model for defining each of the soul’s virtues. Wisdom is defined as good judgment, based on knowledge, concerning what is advantageous for the soul, “both for each part and for the whole, the community composed of all three.” This presumably includes judgment about one’s proper relations with other people. Wisdom is a virtue specifically of the rational part of the soul. Courage is defined as preservation, in the face of temptations, of well-reasoned beliefs about what should and should not be feared. Although the rational part does the reasoning, courage is specifically a virtue of the spirited part of the soul. Temperance is defined as harmony between the parts of the soul resulting from agreement that the rational part should rule – that the desires of the spirited and appetitive parts should be controlled by the desires of the rational part. This is a virtue of the whole soul, of all three parts. Finally, justice is defined as each part of the soul doing its proper job so as to cause the other three virtues to grow and be preserved. This of course is also a virtue of the whole soul, of all three parts. The just person “puts himself in order, becomes his own friend, and harmonizes the three elements together . . . and, from having been many, becomes entirely one, temperate and harmonious. Then and only then should he turn to action, whether it is to do something concerning the acquisition of wealth, or concerning the care of his body, or even something political, or concerning private contracts. In all these areas, he considers and calls just and fine the action that preserves this inner harmony and helps achieve it.”Provided the spirited part comes to see it as a matter of honor to defend the interests of the rational part, it is not hard to see how these two parts of the soul can be allies. But how is it possible for temperance to include the myopic appetitive part, so concerned, as it is, with satisfactions near at hand? How can the appetitive part appreciate that it is in its interest to be ruled by the rational part? (Recall the analogous question above about the workers putting trust in the rulers.) Would Socrates say that the appetitive part can be educated, or at any rate, trained to be submissive to reason?Is Socrates right to define justice as each part of a soul doing its own proper job – the rational part ruling wisely, the spirited part courageously sticking up for what the rational part determines is right, and the appetitive part keeping us eating, drinking, breathing, and so on, under the supervision and guidance of the rational part? Is this what it is for a person to be just?